Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in the Kyrgyz Republic by Christensen, Garry & Pomfret, Richard
 












Garry Christensen and Richard Pomfret 
 
 













Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 04, August 2007 
 
This is a product of a research project on Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, under the leadership of Kym 
Anderson of the World Bank’s Development Research Group (www.worldbank.org/agdistortions). The authors are 
grateful for helpful comments from workshop participants and for funding from the World Bank’s Europe and 
Central Asia Department and Trust Funds provided by the governments of Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands (BNPP) 
and the United Kingdom (DfID). 
 
This Working Paper series is designed to promptly disseminate the findings of work in progress for comment before 
they are finalized. The views expressed are the authors’ alone and not necessarily those of the World Bank and its 







•  The Kyrgyz Republic was one of the poorest Soviet republics and one whose economy was 
most hard-hit by the end of central planning and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
 
•  In the Soviet economy the Kyrgyz republic was a substantial importer of grains, and an 
exporter of tobacco, cotton, and livestock products. Livestock products accounted for two-
thirds and crops one-third of farm output. The most important agricultural outputs (valued at 
Soviet relative prices) in 1990 were beef and veal (13 percent), milk (17 percent), sheep meat 
(11 percent) and wool (12 percent). The main crops were tobacco (8 percent) and grains (6 
percent), with fruit and vegetables in total also accounting for 6 percent. Cotton accounted 
for less than 2 percent of farm output in 1990, but was important as a readily exportable crop 
to hard currency markets. 
 
•  After independence in 1991 the Kyrgyz Republic experienced a severe transitional recession 
and high incidence of poverty. Incipient recovery in 1996-7 was damaged by the Russian 
Crisis of 1998 and a domestic banking crisis, and again by a debt crisis in 2001. 
Nevertheless, farm output recovered substantially after the mid-1990s and overall 
agricultural performance in the decade after 1991 was the best in the CIS. 
 
•  The composition of farm output changed substantially during the 1990s as areas under the 
staple crops, wheat and potatoes, increased dramatically. After 1995 other sub-sectors 
recovered but the relative importance of crops to livestock products remained larger than in 
the Soviet era, and some previously important farm outputs (e.g., tobacco and wool) have 
dwindled to insignificance. 
 
•  The transition strategy and economic policies of the Kyrgyz Republic focused on fairly rapid 
price liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and privatization. It was the first former 
Soviet republic to join the World Trade Organization. Comprehensive reform of policies that 
distorted agricultural incentives contributed to the significant reduction in poverty after the 
mid-1990s. However, the longer term effect of the reforms on output has been considered 
disappointing, largely because the institutional environment for a well-functioning market 
economy still does not exist. 
 
•  In the farm sector, prices were quickly freed and subsidies largely eliminated by the mid-
1990s. Initially this was a mixed blessing to farmers, insofar as output prices rose by much 
less than the prices of key inputs. 
 
•  Land privatization was initiated in 1991, but implementation was slow until 1994. Between 
1995 and 2000 almost the entire sector was reformed with the 500 collective and state farms 
being replaced by over 60,000 individual farms. Since 2001 land has been private property in 
a meaningful sense, and a functioning land market exists. 
  
•  Since the mid-1990s the Kyrgyz Republic has had a liberal trade policy, with a maximum 
tariff rate of 15 percent, no specific duties and no quantitative restrictions on trade. The 
currency is convertible and the exchange rate is a managed float without major distortion. 
 
•  Estimates of distortions to agricultural producers’ incentives for six major products (wheat, 
maize, cotton, milk, poultry meat and wool) from 1995 to 2004 indicate that many domestic 
prices are substantially above reference prices based on the border price. This is especially 
true for wheat and maize for which there were large positive price gaps throughout the 
period. The pattern for cotton is more erratic, although farmers appear to have benefited from 
the establishment of a competitive ginning sector in the second half of the 1990s. For the 
livestock products covered in this analysis, the price gap was negative for milk and wool 
during the second half of the 1990s, but has generally been positive since 1999. In the years 
2000-4 wool and poultry meat enjoyed the largest price gap of any of the commodities 
studied. 
 
•  The estimates of producer support, with the possible exception of cotton since 2000, reflect 
the slow process of creating integrated well-functioning markets in the Kyrgyz Republic. For 
most products, high trade costs reduce the usefulness of the world price (or any other border 
price) as an appropriate reference price against which to measure distortions. Farmers may be 
price responsive, but they respond to local prices in a poorly integrated national market 
which is largely disconnected from external markets. 
 
•  Despite the slow process of constructing a market economy, public policy has been good in 
terms of creating ownership rights and competitive market structures. The Kyrgyz Republic 
has been the most reformist of all Central Asian countries, and the policy-induced distortions 
to agriculture are minimal although, as in Kazakhstan, there may be high general costs of 
doing business or market imperfections which drive wedges between border prices, domestic 
market prices and farm-gate prices. Trade and price reform needs to be followed by the 
construction of market-supporting institutions and infrastructure so as to lower the costs of 
trade and help markets to become better integrated. 
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Introduction and summary 
 
 
The Kyrgyz Republic was one of the poorest Soviet republics and, despite attempts by central 
planners to locate industries in the republic, outside the capital city and its neighborhood the 
economy remained predominantly agricultural. When the country became independent in 
December 1991, agriculture accounted for just under two-fifths of GDP. During the transitional 
recession workers moved from the towns to the countryside, and agriculture’s share of GDP 
reached 50 percent in 1996. The share of GDP declined after 1997 as gold production increased, 
but remains above a third, while at least half of the population is directly or indirectly dependent 
on the farm sector for their livelihood.
1 
The country is mountainous and dry.
2 Arable land, accounting for less than ten percent of 
the territory, is concentrated in the Chui valley in the north and the Ferghana valley in the south, 
and about two thirds is irrigated (Table 1). The Tien Shan Mountains divide a heavily populated 
and climatically warmer south from a more sparsely populated and richer north. The three 
southern oblasts (provinces) of Jalalabad, Osh and Batken contain three-fifths of the rural 
population but have only a third of the country’s arable land; agriculture in these oblasts is 
similar to that in neighboring areas of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Chui oblast contains a 
third of the arable land and benefits from the location of the capital and largest city, Bishkek, and 
proximity to Almaty, the largest city in Kazakhstan. The other northern oblasts (Issyk-Kul, 
                                                 
1 Measurement of sectoral shares of GDP is difficult during the 1990s when there was a substantial retreat into 
subsistence farming; the numbers cited here are World Development Indicators data (Appendix Table A1). 
Employment in agriculture is even harder to measure (the more or less constant numbers in Appendix Table A1 fail 
to capture the increase in unpaid farm workers after 1992), but two-thirds of the population in 2004 was rural. 
2 The low average rainfall (415 mm per annum) means that rainfed farming is only possible in limited areas near the 
mountains, but the country is well-endowed with water. The available renewable water resources per capita, 10,613 
cubic meters, are roughly the same as in the United States, but they have historically been shared with downstream 
countries (primarily Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan).    2
Naryn and Talas) are more mountainous. Although agro-ecological conditions are diverse, much 
of the country faces unfavorable conditions associated with low rainfall and irrigation-dependent 
farming, soil problems (water-logging, salinity, nutrient-deficiency, and erosion), overgrazing of 
pasture lands, and an inadequate domestic transport network combined with long distances to 
world markets – the nearest seaport, Novorossiysk, is 3,800 kilometers away. 
This chapter analyses the country’s policies towards agriculture since independence, 
including an attempt to quantify the distortions to agricultural incentives and competitiveness. 
The Kyrgyz experience is characterized by the most liberal reforms in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and also by the best performance of any farm sector in the CIS. At the 
same time, establishment of a well-functioning market economy has been a slow process, and 
corruption and lack of truly competitive markets remain major problems. The first section sets 
out the historical background, describing overall economic strategy and agricultural 
development. The next section examines the evolution of policies affecting the farm sector, 
before quantifying the distortions to agricultural incentives in the third section. The last two 
sections analyze the political economy of policy choices in the Kyrgyz Republic and future 







The economy of the Kyrgyz Republic suffered perhaps more than any other from the breakdown 
of central planning, the dissolution of the USSR and the hyperinflation of the early 1990s. Much 
of the country’s industry had been established as part of Soviet regional dispersion policies, and 
many of the factories were part of long supply chains producing military equipment.
4 In addition 
to the breakdown of Soviet supply chains, Kyrgyzstan suffered from the cessation of net 
transfers from other Soviet republics, which were substantially reduced in 1991 and had ended 
                                                 
3 This section is based on Pomfret (1995; 2006). 
4 In the 1992-5 period, Kyrgyzstan was exporting machinery and equipment, while the output of the machine-
building sector declined sevenfold (Mogilevsky and Hasanov 2004, p. 233), reflecting the destruction of the nation’s 
physical capital stock. During the 1990s private investment was small, apart from a spike in 1995-7 associated with 
the Kumtor goldmine, which reflected low domestic savings rates and failure to attract foreign direct investment 
apart from a single project.   3
completely by May 1993.
5 The initial transition period saw substantial economic decline and 
deindustrialization, accompanied by urban-rural migration as town-dwellers returned to their 
family villages and by the re-emergence of subsistence and informal activities. Real output fell 
by about fifty percent between 1990 and 1995. The collapse of the Soviet economic system and 
shift to a more market-oriented economy led to a sharp increase in inequality; Milanovic (1998) 
calculated Gini values for the Kyrgyz Republic of 0.26 in 1987/8 and 0.55 in 1993/5, 
representing a shift from one of the world’s most equal to one of the world’s most unequal 
distributions within half a decade. With low initial income levels this translated into high rates of 
unaccustomed and unanticipated poverty; using a I$120 per month benchmark, Milanovic 
calculated a poverty rate of 88 percent in 1993 – the highest in any transition economy.
6 
 
Transition strategy and macroeconomic developments 
 
The options available to the newly independent Kyrgyzstan - the names Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz 
Republic, the country’s official name since 1999, will be used interchangeably in this paper – 
were limited. Its main natural resource is the water flowing down from some of the world’s 
highest mountains, but harnessing this for hydroelectricity generation requires large investments 
with long payback periods and grids to take the electricity to reliable markets. In practice, during 
the 1990s, water only led to quarrels with downstream neighbors, who needed it for irrigation but 
were unaccustomed to paying anything like an economic price for water. The single exploitable 
resource was gold in the Kumtor mine, which came to play a dominant part in the monetized 
economy after production came on stream in 1997, but whose physical life is limited.
7 
                                                 
5 The transfers, 13-14 percent of GDP in 1990 according to World Bank estimates (Pomfret 1995, p. 72), are 
difficult to measure because many transactions were within All-Union enterprises which would have been 
unprofitable at opportunity cost prices. 
6 Although data on inequality and poverty in this period of great dislocation must be treated with caution, all 
evidence supports the picture of traumatic economic deprivation during the 1990s (Anderson and Pomfret 2003). 
The adverse costs of rapid loss of purchasing power are illustrated by Howell’s (1996a; 1996b) harrowing picture 
from the southern provinces of the Kyrgyz Republic of families cutting down fruit trees, slaughtering livestock and 
keeping children out of school in order to maintain subsistence consumption levels. 
7 The Kumtor goldmine has estimated deposits of around 700 tonnes. The aggregate rate of economic growth 
remains sensitive to this single enterprise; when a landslide shut down the mine in 2002, GDP growth dropped to 
zero, recovering in 2003 after the mine reopened (Table 3). In 2005 growth again dropped to around zero due to 
reduced gold output, as well as political disruption. The mining industry also produces some non-ferrous metals 
(antimony, mercury, rare earth), and there are undeveloped deposits of gold, tin, tungsten and other metals, as well 
as unexplored coal deposits and possible oilfields.   4
Whether due to limited options or to other reasons, the Kyrgyz Republic had by 1993 
become the country in Central Asia most closely aligned with the view of transition advocated 
by the IMF and the World Bank. In May 1993 it became the first Central Asian country to leave 
the ruble zone and issue its own national currency, and thereafter it was the first to bring 
hyperinflation under control, with annual inflation reduced to below 50 percent in 1995. Price 
and trade reforms were the most sweeping in Central Asia, and in 1998 the Kyrgyz Republic 
became the first of all Soviet successor states, including the Baltic countries, to accede to the 
World Trade Organization. 
Privatization was fairly rapid. Housing and small enterprises were mainly transferred to 
current occupiers and operators. Large and medium-sized enterprises were privatized through a 
voucher scheme. By the end of the 1990s the private sector was producing three-fifths of GDP.
8 
The relative ease of privatization in the Kyrgyz Republic was assisted by the lack of valuable 
assets to be contested. Even among the small enterprises privatized in the early transition years, 
most failed to survive for more than two years (Anderson and Pomfret 2001). 
Despite success in liberalization, stabilization and privatization, the results were not as 
good as expected even though the economy began to register positive growth in 1996 (see Tables 
2 and 3 and Figure 1). The economy was hurt by the 1998 Russian Crisis and by a concomitant 
domestic banking crisis, after which reforms were put on hold. The major source of the 
economic problems was the failure to create an environment in which market forces could 
produce socially desirable outcomes. Despite formal progress in establishing institutions related 
to the rule of law and other market-supporting institutions, in practice market-unfriendly 
institutions such as the importance of personal contacts and the ubiquity of corruption 
dominated.
9 When he encountered obstacles in the mid-1990s, the initially tolerant president 
resorted to ruling by decree, and subsequent elections, while not as outrageously manipulated as 
in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, were not fair. 
                                                 
8 These are the rounded figures quoted in EBRD Transition Reports. In the Kyrgyz Republic the extensive unofficial 
sector makes it likely that the private share was even larger. 
9 In the 1999 BEEPS survey, on the headline measure of perception of corruption as an obstacle to doing business, 
Kyrgyzstan was rated the worst of the twenty transition economies covered – and this was in the face of serious 
competition for the wooden spoon from war-torn and failed states such as Georgia, Moldova, Bosnia and Romania. 
In the 2002 survey, which covered 26 transition countries, Kyrgyzstan moved up to 16
th place on the same measure, 
but it still ranked below the three other Central Asian countries in the survey - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan (Gray, Hellman and Ryterman 2004, p. 12).   5
Macroeconomic management was flawed, as price stability was achieved without 
bringing the budget deficit under control. Assistance from multilateral institutions, by far the 
highest in Central Asia, was used to support consumption rather than to generate future growth. 
High growth rates in 1996 and 1997 proved temporary after the negative shocks of the 1998 
Russian crisis and Kazakhstan’s subsequent devaluation were exacerbated by domestic bank 
failures. In 1996-9 the real exchange rate depreciated by 50 percent against the US dollar. This 
was a slight real appreciation vis-à-vis important CIS trading partners (Russia and Kazakhstan), 
but it led to improved competitiveness relative to other trading partners (e.g. China) and most 
import-substituting activities experienced robust growth between 1998 and 2001. The 
depreciation exacerbated the external debt problem, forcing fiscal adjustment in 2000-1 and 
scaling back of external borrowing, followed by the government obtaining a debt restructuring 
from the Paris Club in 2002. 
After the turn of the century, with a more sustainable macroeconomic policy, 
microeconomic reforms were resumed, especially in areas of deregulation and reduction in 
bureaucratic red tape. Economic growth was not smooth, but it was higher in 2000-4 than it had 
been in 1998-9 (Table 2 and Figure 1). A second Paris Club restructuring in 2005 established a 
more manageable external debt position.
10 Economic recovery was helped by robust growth in 
Russia and Kazakhstan, and after the turn of the century labor migration to those two countries 
and workers’ remittances became significant. 
Nevertheless, popular frustration remained strong. The President’s family, especially his 
daughter and son-in-law, were perceived to be benefiting economically from political 
connections, and in the southern part of the country people complained that the political system 
favored northern groups closer to the President. When political change came, it happened 
remarkably rapidly. The parliamentary elections of February and March 2005 were widely 
perceived as unfair because leading opposition candidates were barred. Protests began in 
Jalalabad on March 10, and within a week both Jalalabad and Osh, the main cities of the South, 
were in opposition hands. The North was initially quiet, until on March 24 crowds converged on 
the seat of government, and the President fled. President Akayev formally resigned on 4 April 
2005, paving the way for the first peaceful transition of political power in Central Asia. After the 
                                                 
10 IMF (2005, p. 14). Whether the Kyrgyz Republic should accept the conditions of the IMF-sponsored scheme for 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) in order to further reduce the debt burden was a major domestic political 
issue in 2006-7.   6
“Tulip Revolution”, new elections were held in June 2005. The government appears to be 
committed to continuity of economic policies, but the political situation remains fluid. A new 
constitution in 2006 granted greater powers to the Parliament, although how effective this 




At the time of independence the most important agricultural outputs (valued at Soviet relative 
prices) were livestock products: beef and veal (13 percent), milk (17 percent), sheep meat (11 
percent) and wool (12 percent). The main crops were tobacco (8 percent) and grains (6 percent), 
with fruit and vegetables also accounting for 6 percent (Table 4 and Appendix Tables A1 and 
A2). Cotton accounted for less than 2 percent of farm output in 1990, but was important as a 
readily exportable crop to hard currency markets. 
A large part of Kyrgyzstan’s pre-independence level of livestock output was based on 
high levels of support for state and collective livestock production, funded from outside the 
republic. In order to maximize the use of extensive pastoral grazing areas, this budgetary support 
was used to raise the capacity for carrying stock through the winter by importing manufactured 
feed and housing animals during the winter, and then using publicly owned trucks to transport 
livestock to and from the pastoral areas during the spring and summer. Fine wool sheep breeds 
were given particular support in this system as they are well adapted to pastoral grazing and 
produce high value wool. This highly subsidized structure led to widespread overgrazing of the 
pastoral areas. The system rapidly collapsed when Russian budget support ceased. Livestock 
were slaughtered as farmers were unable to feed and house them during the winter. Fine wool 
production fell concomitantly.
11 
In the Soviet economy the Kyrgyz republic was a substantial importer of grains, and an 
exporter of tobacco, cotton, and livestock products. The largest industrial enterprise in the 
country was a refinery which processed sugar imported from Cuba for sale throughout the 
USSR; after independence, as transport was costed at economic rates and these supply chains 
                                                 
11 The composition of the sheep flocks shifted dramatically towards fat-tailed sheep raised for their meat and 
producing low-quality wool. The decline in wool output may be overstated in official data (as in Table 4) because 
much of the low quality wool is now sold through an informal market of domestic and foreign buyers who pay cash 
and avoid taxes. According to the World Bank (2005, p. 51), the informal market may account for “up to 80 
percent” of the wool market.   7
collapsed, raw sugar was imported from China and refined sugar exported to Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. There was also a two-way trade in dairy products, which after independence 
consisted of exports to Uzbekistan and imports of more processed items from Russia and the rest 
of the world. In 1994, the main agricultural exports were wool ($25 million), tobacco ($20 
million) and cotton ($19 million), and the dominant agricultural import was wheat ($54 million); 
no other agricultural import was valued at over $5 million (Appendix Tables A3 and A4). 
Agricultural production fell considerably from 1990 to 1995, accompanied by a 
demonetization and retreat into self-supply during the transitional recession. There were large 
changes in output composition during the 1990-7 period as wheat output increased by 164 
percent, and potatoes and sugar beet also experienced large increases in output.
12 The area under 
winter wheat increased from 183,000 to 360,000 hectares and the area under spring wheat from 
11,000 to 193,000 hectares, replacing barley and fodder crops.
13 The collapse of international 
and domestic trade in the early 1990s encouraged greater focus on wheat and potatoes, both 
staple foods which are easy to store. The area sown to vegetables and cotton also increased in 
this period, but insufficiently to offset falling yields.
14 Area sown to tobacco and barley, both 
cash crops, fell substantially during the 1990s. Meanwhile, high input prices and inadequate 
availability of fodder led to drastic cuts in livestock numbers and falling output especially of 
poultry products, sheep and goats, and pigs. The Kyrgyz Republic shifted from being a net 
importer of primary agricultural products in 1993 to a net exporter in 1997. At the same time, 
due to quality problems in the agro-processing sector, it shifted from being a net exporter to a net 
importer of processed agricultural products.
15 
Aggregate farm output began to pick up in 1996 and 1997, reflecting responses to post-
1995 land privatization and favorable prices, helped by good weather in 1996 and 1997. 
                                                 
12 The Kyrgyz sugar beet crop was devastated by disease in the 1980s and some output growth in the 1990s 
represented a rebounding from this disaster. The extent to which the growth in beet production during the mid-1990s 
was justified is, however, debatable as it mainly supplied the pre-existing refinery, which had temporarily turned to 
China for raw sugar, but which is energy inefficient and technologically obsolete. 
13 The share of wheat in the total sown area increased from 15 percent in 1990/1 to 46 percent in 1996/7, while the 
share of fodder crops fell from 50 percent to 25 percent (World Bank 1998, p. 12). 
14 Fresh and processed vegetables had been an important export to other Soviet republics, but as transport costs 
increased and Kyrgyz products had to compete with better quality imports from outside the former Soviet Union, 
those markets collapsed in the early 1990s. To some extent wool exports, which had also been intra-USSR, suffered 
a similar fate, exacerbated by the decline in sheep numbers and the quality of wool. 
15 In 1993 the deficit on trade in primary agricultural products was $18.9 million and in 1997 the surplus was $10.6 
million. Trade in processed food went from a $12.1 million surplus in 1993 to a $3.7 million deficit in 1997 (World 
Bank 1998, p. 61).   8
Livestock production, which had remained strong on household plots, began to expand after the 
mid-1990s as incomes recovered and the demand for livestock products increased, although this 
further hastened the decline of fine wool sheep production as the emphasis shifted to meat and 
dual purpose sheep breeds, produced on a small-scale but intensive basis. More recently, 
improved access to livestock feed from Kazakhstan has given impetus to restructuring and 
growth, particularly for poultry production. Hence the decline in livestock production as a share 
of agricultural sector output and the shift from extensive to intensive production systems 
represent a rational economic response to a new and less distorted policy environment.  
Despite the negative impact on export demand of the 1998 Russian crisis, robust 
agricultural growth continued in the late 1990s and early 2000s. By the end of 2001 agricultural 
output had regained pre-transition levels. Indeed, over the first decade after independence 
agricultural performance, whether in terms of gross output, increased labor productivity or 
improved yields, was probably the best in all Soviet successor states (Rozelle and Swinnen 
2004). The recovery which began in the second half of the 1990s was characterized by a shift to 
more commercial activities, including products with higher income elasticity of demand such as 
livestock products and fruit and vegetables, while wheat output fell from its 1997 peak. 
Over the period 1990-2004 a substantial reorientation of Kyrgyz agriculture occurred. 
Crops are relatively more important now and livestock products less important than at the time of 
independence. Among grains, wheat has become clearly dominant. The vegetable sub-sector is 
diversified: 2004 output in million som consisted of potatoes 4,272, tomatoes 892, cabbage 879, 
onions 599, carrots 547 and cucumbers 395.
 Among livestock products, both dairy and eggs have 
recovered from 1995 troughs. Some agricultural sub-sectors, which were important in 1990, 
notably wool and to a lesser extent tobacco, have been practically eliminated.  
 
 
Evolution of policies since 1991 
 
 
Policies affecting agriculture have followed the general economic strategy described in the 
previous section. In the initial years following independence the picture is confused as prices 
were freed but well-functioning markets did not exist. Some subsidies were maintained to shelter   9
consumers and producers from the deep recession, but these had been abandoned by 1995. 
Indirect subsidies through credit markets and under-priced inputs such as water and electricity 
remain, but farmers operate in a market setting. Land reform was likewise slow to be 
implemented in 1991-4, but after that there were far-reaching changes as state and collective 
farms were replaced by individual farms and, more recently, land markets have been established. 
Trade policy has been liberal with low and fairly uniform tariffs and few non-tariff barriers to 
trade, and the currency has been convertible since 1995.  
 
Prices and subsidies 
 
The Soviet economic system was based on distorted accounting prices, and large direct and 
indirect subsidies. Agricultural input and output prices were all below world prices, but price 
distortions generally worked in favor of farmers. Output prices were closer to world prices than 
were the prices for key inputs (fertilizers, machinery and transport), although some crops (e.g. 
cotton and grains) were favored relative to others. After independence output and input prices, 
apart from irrigation water, electricity and railway tariffs, were quickly deregulated.
16 The price 
of inputs, which are almost all imported, quickly rose to world price levels, while output prices 
adjusted more slowly due to local monopolies and poor infrastructure.
17 Relative prices changed 
substantially (see Table A5 for crop prices). 
In 1993-5 the government maintained some direct subsidies and budget transfers to soften 
the impact of the transitional recession on consumers and enterprises. The main items in 1993 
were bread subsidies of 70.6 million som, other food subsidies of 3.9 million som, and 78.8 
million som on enterprise support. By 1995 these transfers had been reduced to 20.0, 3.5 and 4.0 
million som, and after 1995 they were eliminated as support switched to interest rate subsidies.
18 
                                                 
16 Although state orders were abolished in 1994, considerable administrative interference in markets continued at the 
local level (World Bank 1998, p. 25). The state needs system after 1994 involved voluntary supply (mainly for the 
1,000-ton national wheat reserve) at negotiated prices. Water charges were introduced in 1992, but fees paid by 
farmers only cover a small fraction of the actual expenditures by the Department of Water Resources; in 2003 
farmers paid 119 million som and the actual budget expenditure was 1,020 million som (World Bank 2004, p. 42). 
17 The World Bank (1998, p. 50) stated that “In 1996, most farm product prices in the Kyrgyz Republic were two-
thirds to three-quarters of the corresponding prices in the United States, yet Kyrgyz farmers paid close to world 
prices for agricultural inputs.” The evolution of input/output prices for seven major farm products are given in 
World Bank (1998, Table A4.1). See also Mudahar (1998, pp. 49-51). 
18 Data from the Budget Execution reports of the Government of Kyrgyzstan. In 1993, 153.3 million som was 
equivalent to $24.3 million (roughly $5 per capita). In 1995, 27.5 million som was equivalent to $2.5 million.    10
Budget loans to companies, oblasts (for bread price support) and Agroprombank 
amounted to 814.1 million som in 1995.
19 Credit subsidies were switched to directed credit 
through banks, to agricultural enterprises and to the Ministry of Water (total of 240.9 million 
som in 1996 and 277.8 million som in 1997), and then were phased out in 1998 (83.1 million 
som) and 1999 (zero). In 2000-3 small amounts of subsidized credit went to agricultural 
enterprises through the banking system (between 7 and 24 million som per annum). These credit 
subsidies were eliminated in 2004. 
Budgetary support for agriculture was minor during the 1990s. At the time of WTO 
accession in December 1998 the Ministry of Finance reported that total budgetary support was 
much below one percent of gross agricultural output (Mogilevsky 2004, p. 13; World Bank 1998, 
p. 75). The total budget expenditure for agriculture and water resources in 1999 of 389 million 
som was less than $10 million. Nevertheless, indirect subsidies (low charges for irrigation water 
or electricity) continued to distort input use and the composition of farm output.
20 
 
Privatization and organizational structure 
 
Agrarian reform was difficult because of population pressure on the land and suspicion of the 
creation of a rich peasant (kulak) class. Various measures of arable land per person in the late 
Soviet era all indicate population pressure in rural Central Asia, but an added problem in the 
Kyrgyz Republic was the regional variation. Irrigated land per person was much less in the 
southern districts of Jalalabad and Osh than in the mountain areas or the northern districts (Table 
1). A further complication in the south was the ethnic tensions over land; the worst outbreak of 
violence in Central Asia during the Gorbachev era followed a reallocation in 1990 of land tilled 
                                                 
19 In 1996 annual inflation was about 35 percent and market interest rates 45-120 percent but farm credit from the 
public budget or donor-supported programs charged 9-12 percent, which stimulated demand for subsidized credit 
and crowded out all other forms of credit, to the detriment of creating a viable financial sector. Facing massive 
defaults on agricultural loans made in 1992-6 Agroprombank was replaced by a Debt Resolution Agency in July 
1996, and an independent non-banking public financial institution, Kyrgyz Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(KAFC), was subsequently established as part of a World-Bank-supported Rural Finance Project. In 1997 the KAFC 
charged annual interest rates of over 30 percent when inflation was about 15 percent. Credit unions were also 
established as part of an ADB-supported Rural Credit Project. Since 1997 a large number of non-bank financial 
institutions providing rural credit have emerged in the Kyrgyz Republic, supported by defining legislation in 1999 
and 2002, and considered to be a success story in the region. 
20 Other indirect subsidies are provided through the research institutes which deliver new seed varieties to farms and 
through the distribution of inputs received by the government as aid (e.g. fertilizers from Japan 1994-7 or tractors 
and combines from Japan 1995-2001) or in barter deals (e.g., tractors from Belarus in 2002).    11
by ethnic Uzbeks to ethnic Kyrgyz, and several hundred people were killed in the ensuing 
interethnic riots. 
Land reform laws date from February 1991, but implementation was slow until 1994. The 
initial laws on peasant farms and land reform in February and April 1991 were resisted by local 
officials and by managers of state and collective farms. The situation was complicated by the 
November 1991 decree creating the National Land Fund, which favored distribution to ethnic 
Kyrgyz. Starting in February 1994 the legal situation of individual farmers was clarified and in 
May detailed non-discriminatory regulations for the National Land Fund were promulgated. 
Further reforms in 1995 created more representative committees for implementing farm 
enterprise reorganization, which reduced the influence of local officials and of state and 
collective farm managers. 
Between 1995 and 2000 reform accelerated and the approximately 500 collective and 
state farms averaging over 2,500 hectares per farm at the time of independence were replaced by 
over 60,000 farms averaging about 20 hectares per farm (World Bank 2004, vol. II, p. 130).
21 By 
early 2002 about half of the arable land was cultivated by individual farmers, a fifth was owned 
individually but managed under a reformed collective or privatized structure, a quarter was held 
by the community-based Land Redistribution Fund (LRF),
22 and the remaining five percent was 
in the hands of about twenty state research farms, mostly seed and livestock breeding farms 
(Cord et al. 2004, p. 177). The successor organizations operated at first with long-term leases. 
Following a 1998 referendum, private land ownership was legalized, but a five-year moratorium 
was placed on transactions involving land. In September 2001 the moratorium on rural land sales 
was lifted, although restrictions were imposed (e.g. land could only be sold to a member of the 
same community). By the mid-2000s land was private property in a meaningful sense, and a land 
market was functioning. 
Land reform in the Kyrgyz Republic has been among the most far-reaching in the former 
Soviet Union, and has certainly gone much further than anywhere else in Central Asia. Many 
                                                 
21 Giovarelli (1998) reported very large differences in productivity between individually-owned and state or 
collective farms; although the two groups each cultivated about half of the ploughed land by 1996, the individual 
farms’ output was worth 12.25 billion sum while that of the state and collective farms was worth 3.05 billion sum. 
This may partly reflect the geographical pattern of ownership, with individual farms dominant in the fertile Chui 
valley in the north and state and collective farms dominant in the poorer south (Mudahar 1998, pp. 45-6). 
22 Initially about half of total irrigated arable land, in most cases the best land, was transferred to a National Land 
Fund. This was subsequently reduced to a quarter and the National Land Fund was replaced by the LRF, which has 
since 2001 been managed by local governments. Currently LRF land can only be leased.   12
observers ascribe a key role to land reform in the post-1995 revival of Kyrgyz agriculture. 
Access to some inputs and to rural credit remains imperfect but farmers have substantial control 
over their land and, although there is little hard empirical evidence, the expectation is that they 
will be responsive to price incentives. 
In the agro-industrial complex, a large number of state-owned enterprises were privatized 
during the 1990. This reduced the government’s obligations to loss-making enterprises, although 
in some cases (e.g. fertilizers and farm machinery) public monopolies became de facto private 
monopolies (World Bank 1998, p. 3). 
The cotton sector saw a rapid expansion of the number of cotton gins from three at the 
end of the Soviet era to 23 in 2005, at least nine of which were built after 1999 (Sadler 2006, p. 
98).
23 The ginners play a key role in providing finance to cotton producers, initially raised from 
international sources and since 2000 largely from their own resources. The farmer contracts to 
deliver seed cotton to the gin in return for local currency advances to pay for inputs and labor.
24 
Despite the apparent competition Sadler (2006, p. 99) reports average prices received by farmers 
for seed cotton in 2003 as $450 per ton in the Kyrgyz Republic and $550 in Kazakhstan, and he 
explains the difference by the monopsony power of Kyrgyz gins. However, the average price 
masks regional variations, e.g. Sadler reports that the price was $75 higher in Jalalabad than in 
Osh (the two cotton-producing oblasts in southern Kyrgyzstan), which may be due to market 




The Kyrgyz Republic’s trade policies are difficult to track in the early post-independence years 
because borders were extremely porous.
25 In 1994 the government abolished the state monopoly 
                                                 
23 Lupton (2002) reporting on a fieldtrip in autumn 2002 identified twenty-two gins: three big Soviet era plants 
(privatized in 1992-4), three owned by a Russian group, five Turkish-owned and eleven other private gins whose 
owners included English, German and Uzbek companies. Most of the new plants use second-hand equipment, either 
re-sited from other former Soviet republics or roller gins from Turkey. The five roller gins are slower but have a 
higher out-turn (38-39 percent) with better quality fiber. 
24 Initially the gins offered a local currency price, bearing all the exchange rate and world price risk, but in recent 
years prices have been pegged to the Cotlook A world price index. Many inputs are smuggled from Uzbekistan 
where they are subsidized. 
25 A large part of international trade in the 1990s was conducted by individual shuttle traders (chelnoki) operating 
between Central Asia and cities in the Gulf, China, India or Southeast Asia, and often bypassing or bribing the 
customs officials. The shuttle trade phenomenon has become relatively less important in the twenty-first century as   13
on international trade, and since 1995 the Kyrgyz Republic has pursued a trade policy based on 
moderate most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs with a maximum rate of 15 percent and no specific 
duties (Appendix Tables A6 and A7). Most tariffs were set at 10 percent, with 5 percent for 
imports from developing countries and 0 percent on intra-CIS trade. The effective tariff in the 
second half of the 1990s was around 2 percent. Higher VAT rates applied to imported goods than 
to identical domestically produced goods, but this was discontinued after WTO accession in 
1998. 
In February 1996 the Kyrgyz Republic initiated its WTO accession process and became a 
WTO member in December 1998. The Kyrgyz Republic’s WTO commitments are remarkably 
liberal, with bound tariffs set at low rates and with virtually all sectors included in its GATS 
commitments (Mogilevsky 2004). The growth of international trade and integration into the 
global economy since WTO accession has been disappointing, partly because the business 
environment remains unattractive to private investors due to the poor institutional arrangements 
and widespread corruption, but it is also due to geography (Raballand 2003; Cadot, Carrere and 
Grigorion 2006) and to lack of regional cooperation to facilitate transit (ADB 2006; UNDP 
2005) 
Neither Russia nor any other Central Asian country was a WTO member as of mid-2007, 
so that the Kyrgyz Republic operates in a dual-track trade environment whereby much of its 
trade is conducted outside WTO rules. The Kyrgyz Republic is a member of several regional 
organizations, of which the most significant is the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) which 
contains its major CIS trading partners. In 1996 the Kyrgyz Republic signed a customs union 
agreement with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, and in 1999 the union was extended to include 
Tajikistan.
26 In February 2000, reflecting the lack of progress towards a customs union, a new 
agreement was signed, which envisaged tariff harmonization within five years, but by 2005 the 
common external tariff covered only 6,156 of the 11,086 tariff lines identified in the union’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
the retail sector, especially in the principal cities has become better organized. The export taxes introduced in 1992 
to limit the outflow of goods were soon abolished, although exports outside the CIS were subject to the 20 percent 
VAT and some exports required hygiene certificates. 
26 In October 2000 the union was renamed the Eurasian Economic Community and the institutional structure was 
strengthened. In October 2005 Uzbekistan acceded to the Eurasian Economic Community, and this was 
accompanied by dissolution of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, another regional organization with lofty 
aspirations but minimal achievements. The Kyrgyz Republic is also a member of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, neither of which has had an impact on trade policy 
(UNDP 2005; Pomfret 2006, Ch. 10).   14
classification system (and these were largely ones where the members’ pre-existing tariffs had 
been similar). The main reason why an EEC common external tariff is unacceptable to the 
Kyrgyz Republic or Kazakhstan is that Russia’s tariffs are higher than those of the Kyrgyz 
Republic or Kazakhstan, both on average and with peaks on individual items. It is highly 
unlikely that Russia would agree to cutting its tariffs to the bound rates agreed by the Kyrgyz 
Republic in its WTO accession, but even if the Kyrgyz authorities were tempted to override their 
WTO obligations, they would not want to raise tariffs which would hurt the country’s consumers 
to the benefit of Russian producers, when Russia’s own tariffs would remain unchanged 
providing no new preferential advantage to Kyrgyz exporters (Tumbarello 2005, Table 4). In 
sum, despite strong paper commitments the EEC is unlikely to evolve into a stronger trading 
arrangement in the near future. 
Despite the existence of a regional agreement, the Kyrgyz Republic’s trade relations with 
its contiguous neighbours suffer from lack of WTO commitments. Following the 1998 Russian 
Crisis, Kazakhstan introduced a number of draconian import duties, including tariffs of up to 200 
percent on dairy fats and margarines, which hurt Kyrgyz dairy exports. The Kyrgyz Republic 
reacted with restrictions on the wheat trade, although a seasonal (July-November) export tax on 
wheat in 1999 and 2000 appeared to have minimal impact. More important than trade taxes has 
been the lack of agreement on issues such as customs valuation or transit which have augmented 
the costs of inter-regional trade in Central Asia. A frequently quoted number in the late 1990s 
was that a truck transiting Kazakhstan from the Kyrgyz Republic to Russia could expect to have 
to pay $1700 in unofficial charges.
27 The situation with Kazakhstan has improved substantially 
since December 2003.
28 With Uzbekistan, however, there has been no progress in alleviating 
trade restrictions, which include cumbersome customs clearance procedures and frequent border 
closures. 
                                                 
27 Stryker and Livinets (2002, pp. 32 and 59-61) report that, out of the $4500 it costs to send a 20-ton truck of apples 
from Issyk-Kul, in the Kyrgyz Republic to Russia, $1500-2000 goes to “bribes and other unnecessary transactions 
costs”; the same farm estimated that it paid about 30,000 som in domestic bribes before their 160 tons of apples left 
the farm (ie about 0.04 US cents per kilogram). Stryker and Livinets (2002, p. 68) also provide a case study of a 
tomato paste exports from the Kyrgyz Republic to Russia, Belarus and the Baltic countries, which must pay illegal 
transactions costs at the Kazakhstan border of $300 per truck and then give 2-4 jars of tomato paste at the each of 
the police stops through Kazakhstan. 
28 In January 2005 the Kazakhstan parliament ratified the 1998 International Transport Agreement, establishing 
permit-free transit for Kyrgyz trucks and in March 2005 the two countries’ customs authorities signed an agreement 
establishing that transiting trucks do not have to pay a deposit at the border and no longer have to be accompanied 
by customs officials. See IMF (2005, p. 14).   15
 
 
Quantifying the distortions 
 
 
The expectation from the discussion in the previous section is that policy-induced price 
distortions should be small both within the Kyrgyz Republic’s agricultural sector and for 
agriculture relative to other sectors. The main export products, cotton, tobacco and wool, have 
not been affected by significant subsidies or by taxes. For cotton this is in contrast to neighboring 
Uzbekistan where state marketing boards attempt to cream off a large part of the rents, inducing 
farmers to smuggle their crops across the border into the Kyrgyz Republic where they can 
receive closer to the world price (Pomfret 2008). Agricultural activities have not been heavily 
protected by tariffs, either as a group or individually. The government drastically cut back on 
subsidies to the farm sector during the 1990s. In general, input prices have been unregulated 
since the early 1990s, although key exceptions are water for which payment is not always 
enforced and electricity. Agriculture has also benefited from credit subsidies, although these 
appear to have been minor. 
There are no published producer support estimates (PSEs) for the Kyrgyz Republic. The 
OECD has produced estimates for transition economies, but the only CIS countries covered 
before 2007 were Russia (Melyukhina 2003) and Ukraine (OECD and World Bank 2004). Those 
two studies indicate at the aggregate level large positive PSEs up to 1991 that were sharply 
reversed in 1992 before increasing to positive values again.
29 In broad terms, we may expect 
PSEs in the Kyrgyz Republic to have exhibited a similar pattern of pre-1991 positive PSEs 
turning negative in 1992 as output prices increased by less than input prices, but policy 
divergence among the Soviet successor states is likely to have increased as the Soviet legacy 
recedes further into the past. 
The remainder of this section makes a preliminary attempt at estimating the nominal rates 
of assistance facing producers of some of the main agricultural products, using the methodology 
outlined in Anderson et al. (2006). The six commodities covered in Tables 6, 7 and 8 account for 
                                                 
29 In Russia the aggregate PSE rose to 17-30 percent of gross farm receipts in 1995-7, before falling to positive 
single-digit rates after the 1998 Crisis. In Ukraine post-1993 PSEs were lower and in some years negative for grains, 
oilseeds, livestock and dairy products, but higher for sugar beet.   16
35-40 percent of agricultural output.
30 Particular attention is paid to wheat, the Repulic’s largest 
single farm output, and cotton, its most important farm export item. These estimates must be 
treated with caution because it is difficult to identify appropriate reference prices, the producer 
prices are derived from sale in domestic markets (rather than at the farm-gate), and assumptions 
about transport and handling costs are approximations. Unfortunately, the problems with 
establishing a plausible reference price were especially acute for two of the major agricultural 
products, beef and veal (due to the heterogeneous nature of the output) and potatoes (due to their 
being largely non-traded). For all products, attempts to create reasonable price estimates for the 
hyperinflationary years before 1995 were impossible, and even for 1996-8 the implausible 





The bottom line of Table 6 indicates that the gap between the domestic price for wheat and the 
border price adjusted for transport and handling costs amounted to 65-72 percent of the domestic 
price in 2000-3. In 2004 the gap was substantially smaller (49 percent), but this may reflect an 
inappropriately high border price.
31 The pattern of a substantial positive gap between domestic 
prices and reference prices is also apparent in the data for 1995-9 (Table 8 and Figure 2), 
although there is more variation in these years. In all years, the price gap may be overestimated if 
the reference price is too low due to an underestimated border price or an inflated allowance for 
transport and handling, but comparison with other “world price” indicators or with border prices 
used by the OECD to estimate wheat PSEs for Russia or Ukraine suggest that the border price 
used in Table 6 cannot be too far out. Similarly, although transport costs clearly vary by location, 
changing the numbers in line 5 of Table 6 would not alter the sign of the support estimates. In 
                                                 
30 This share applies to both 1990 and 2004, although the relative weights differ, with wool much more important in 
1990. Data were collected for eleven commodities, accounting for over three-quarters of agricultural output in 2004, 
and the relatively small share of products covered in Table 8 reflects difficulties in establishing reference prices. 
31 The import prices used for the analysis of wheat are unit values derived from Kyrgyz wheat imports from 
Kazakhstan. These follow a similar pattern to measures of Kazakhstan’s wheat export prices and other regional 
indicators of wheat prices for 2000-2004, and on this basis the 2004 border price in Table 6 is treated as a legitimate 
trend in the regional market for wheat. The 50 percent price increase in 2004 is, however, not reflected in indicators 
of world wheat prices, such as the FAO index of world wheat prices which increased by only 7 percent from 2003 to 
2004.   17
sum, domestic market prices in the Kyrgyz Republic have consistently been higher than an 
appropriate reference price; Table 6 suggest that the price gap is substantial, even though the 
numbers should be treated as no more than rough approximations.
32 
In the period 1990-7 there was a massive increase in the area sown to wheat and in wheat 
output. This reflected a retreat into staple consumption, problems of storage for more perishable 
products, and import substitution as trade with Kazakhstan became more difficult and costly than 
it had been in the Soviet Union. The existence of high domestic prices for wheat is not 
surprising, although the use of domestic market prices rather than farm-gate prices makes it hard 
to interpret the large price gap or to identify its proximate determinants. During the 1990s and 
early 2000s policy-caused distortions may partially explain the price gap; there are reports of 
local authorities encouraging wheat-growing, although it is unclear with what policy instruments, 
and in the early 2000s there was a small seasonal export tax on wheat, but these seem inadequate 
to explain a large policy-induced distortion in favor of wheat. The price gap is more plausibly 
explained by a general lack of integration of the domestic and the external market, and the drop 
in the support estimate for 2004 may be capturing a diminution in the structural problems which 




Of all Kyrgyz farm products, cotton sales are most integrated into world markets, so selecting 
appropriate border prices is least problematic for this crop. Nonetheless, calculating support for 
cotton farmers is complicated by the need for there to be a processing stage between the raw 
cotton sold by the farmer and the ginned cotton which is exported. Table 7 illustrates the 
calculations starting from the Cotlook “world price” for cotton fiber. In converting the reference 
price into a price for raw cotton a constant ginning outturn of 36 percent is assumed.
33 The 
                                                 
32 Using the border price as the denominator would assign a lower numerical value to the distortion. Inclusion of 
budget support for wheat farmers would increase the measured distortions, although the numbers in Table 5 indicate 
that such an adjustment would not be large. 
33 The actual outturns in the Kyrgyz Republic have been highly volatile. Sadler (2006), using FAOSTAT data on 
aggregate output of raw cotton and of cotton fiber, calculates wide swings between 27 percent in 1993 or 29 percent 
in 1999 and 40 percent in 1997 or 47 percent in 2003. One reason is that the raw cotton data need to be treated with 
caution due to widespread smuggling from Uzbekistan to the Kyrgyz Republic to avoid the former’s state marketing 
systems and from Tajikistan to the Kyrgyz Republic where the ginning sector is more competitive (Pomfret 2008). If 
the raw cotton numbers are volatile due to uneven patterns of smuggling (for example, after Uzbekistan introduced 
exchange controls in 1996 or when Uzbekistan tightened monitoring of its border with Kazakhstan in 2001-2), then   18
estimates are sensitive to this and other assumptions, and at first sight the pattern appears to be 
one of implausibly volatile distortions in favor of or against cotton farmers between 1995 and 
2004, rather than the small negative values that would be expected for an export crop produced 
under fairly competitive and undistorted market conditions. 
As for most of the Kyrgyz economy, price data are difficult to interpret in the high 
inflation years of the early 1990s, but the cotton calculations show plausible low support 
estimates for 1995, 1996 and 1998. The exceptional years in the late 1990s occurred when there 
was a large nominal depreciation of the Kyrgyz som against the US dollar – from 12.8 to 17.4 in 
1997 and from 20.9 to 39.0 in 1999 (and to 47.7 in 2000). In these years the som value of the 
border price increased sharply while domestic producer prices were more sluggish, so that the 
estimated price gap is negative and large. Since 2000 the exchange rate has been more stable, but 
in both 2001 and 2004, which were years when world cotton prices dived, cotton buyers in the 
Kyrgyz Republic offered prices early in the season which turned out to be too high. Whether the 
high September prices equated to windfall gains to cotton farmers or whether they were more of 
a statistical artifact influencing the calculation of domestic prices is difficult to know, but they 
contributed to estimates in Table 7 of large positive assistance in 2001 and 2004. In the more 
stable (from the perspective of world cotton prices) years 2002 and 2003, the small negative 
support estimates are consistent with a non-distorted export sector.  
Inexperience with market mechanisms applies not just to the cotton buyers who failed to 
forecast world price downturns, but even more to farmers who seem to be surprisingly poorly 
informed. A continuing feature of the cotton economy is the presence of itinerant buyers who 
profit from the farmers’ limited knowledge of prices, and perhaps their need for cash, by buying 
cotton at low prices. The gap between the “producer price” in Table 7, which is the price of raw 
cotton delivered to the gin and what the farmers actually receive is probably the largest distortion 




                                                                                                                                                             
the ginning outturn data will also be volatile. Peaks in ginning outturns in the Kyrgyz Republic in 1997 and since 
2001 most likely reflect inputs greater than domestic production of seed cotton.    19
Estimates of price gaps for six major products from 1995 to 2004 indicate that the domestic 
prices are generally above an appropriate reference price, and often substantially so. This is 
especially true for wheat and maize, for which the price gap generally exceeded 50 percent of the 
domestic price.
34 The pattern for cotton is more erratic, although farmers appear to have 
benefited from the establishment of a competitive ginning sector in the second half of the 1990s 
and are operating in a fairly non-distorted setting. For the livestock products covered in this 
analysis, the price gap was negative for milk and wool producers during the second half of the 
1990s, but has generally been positive since 1999. In the years 2000-4 wool and poultry meat 
producers enjoyed the highest support of any of the commodities studied. 
How do these distortion estimates relate to the patterns of farm output and the policies 
affecting the agricultural sector which were described in the first two sections of this paper? A 
major problem is deriving border prices which are a useful reference price when there is little 
trade. This is exacerbated for dairy products and for beef and veal by the heterogeneity of the 
products and possible biases due to the quality composition of small trade volumes.
35 
Since the end of central planning and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the incentives 
facing farmers have been driven by domestic market conditions. In the early and mid-1990s 
domestic demand fell sharply and long distance trade was hurt by market disruption. Output of 
staple food crops (wheat and potatoes) increased, while commercial livestock farming collapsed 
and output of grains used as inputs into livestock production or into agricultural processing fell. 
After 1995 (the last year of negative GDP growth), as people’s income levels began to recover, 
domestic demand increased, especially for meat, dairy products and eggs. However, much of the 
output was sold locally and a national market still scarcely exists. Output of crops like sunflower 
seeds or of fruit and vegetables increased, largely as an import-substitution process even though 
formal trade barriers remained low.
36 The overall picture for the 1990s and into the early 2000s 
is of increased self-sufficiency in primary farm products, even though wheat and flour and oils 
                                                 
34 The price gap while still positive was probably smaller for barley, but the price data were not always consistent. 
Note that in Tables 6 and 7 producer support is equated with the price gap. Although there is also some budget 
support, this is difficult to allocate by farm output, and the magnitude of budget support since 1995 has been small. 
35 The difficulties with using unit values of recorded trade are exacerbated by corruption in the customs service, 
which has been associated with under-invoicing of imports to reduce official duty payments. Anecdotal evidence 
reports that customs officials on both sides turn a blind eye to much of the local cross-border trade in dairy products 
from northern Kyrgyzstan to the Almaty region of Kazakhstan  
36 The biggest increases in vegetable production in the 1990s were of tomatoes, carrots, cabbages and cucumber, 
while production of onions, which had been a significant export as well as a popular domestic vegetable, grew less 
strongly.   20
remain significant imports and beans have emerged as an export crop. In such a situation, 
comparing ‘the’ domestic price to a reference price based on the world price or on the unit value 
of trade in the product makes limited economic sense. 
The collapse of trade in primary products is best illustrated by tobacco, which in the late 
Soviet era was the main non-food crop, accounting for one-twelfth of total farm output and still 
the most important agricultural export in 1994 (Appendix Table A3). After 1994 the acreage 
under tobacco dropped sharply and, despite some recovery in 1998-2000, by 2004 less than a 
third as much land was devoted to tobacco as a decade earlier. Although tobacco continues to be 
exported, its share of output has dwindled to near insignificance (Table 4).
37 
The story of the other Kyrgyz industrial crop, cotton, provides a stark contrast. Raw 
cotton output has increased almost continuously since the early 1990s, and by 2005 cotton 
exports were almost four times larger than tobacco exports and cotton accounted for about one-
third of all agricultural exports. Part of the story is the importance of domestic reform: land 
reform was faster in the cotton-growing oblasts of Osh and Jalalabad (and there were no 
significant scale diseconomies from growing cotton on smaller farms), and the ginning sector 
was also privatized rapidly. Part of the story also has to do with the nature of cotton as an export 
commodity. All across Central Asia cotton was the pillar of the monetized economy after the 
dissolution of the USSR, because western European cotton agents quickly came to the region and 
export of baled cotton to world markets could be organized with less difficulty than exportation 
of any other major farm commodity. This underpinned the relative economic success of 
Uzbekistan, the heart of the Soviet cotton economy, until prices started to fall in 1996. In 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan the cotton sector was repressed by various degrees of 
state control and this encouraged expansion of the originally much smaller cotton sectors in 
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.
38 Some cotton exports from the Kyrgyz Republic are 
smuggled Uzbek cotton, but there has been a genuine expansion of domestic output, especially 
from Jalalabad oblast. The Table 8 estimates are a guide to this story, but an imperfect one. 
Public policy has reduced distortions in the cotton sector and this is reflected in the small 
negative support in 2002 and 2003, but the large positive support estimates for 2001 and 2004 
                                                 
37 Due to differing stages of production, there may be a classification issue in interpreting tobacco entries in 
Appendix Table A5, but the raw crop certainly declined in significance and the Kyrgyz Republic is a large net 
importer of the final product (cigarettes – see Appendix Table A4). 
38 Pomfret (2008). Cotton funded some of the president’s grandiose construction projects in Turkmenistan, and was 
one of the two economic prizes (the other was an aluminum smelter) in the Tajik civil war which ended in 1997.   21
indicate either the immaturity of market mechanisms in the cotton sector or a lack of concern for 
short-run profit-maximization.
39 
The construction of a more efficient market economy is a slow and continuous process. It 
is helped by improvements in the physical infrastructure as well as in the soft infrastructure that 
facilitates trade, but that process became internationalized only after 2003 when the Kazakhstan 
economy was clearly booming and the costs of entering or transiting the country were reduced.
40 
The apparent paradox between the description of policy interventions in the second section and 
the estimated price gaps in Table 8 can be explained by the time taken to replace the 
coordinating mechanisms of central planning by a well-functioning market economy - a process 
which has been hindered in the Kyrgyz Republic by lack of any pre-Soviet tradition of a modern 
market economy and by geographical isolation (in turn exacerbated by the large increase in trade 
costs with key neighbors).
41 The main responses to the shocks of the early 1990s – cuts in 
commercial livestock farming and expansion of staple crops – are easy to explain but, because 
they reflected retreats from commercial farming, they are poorly picked up by price-gap 
measures of distortions. At a conceptual level, open trade policy and low levels of protection 
have a limited impact on domestic prices when domestic markets are extremely weak, 
subsistence oriented production results in low marketed surplus, and transaction costs are high, 
                                                 
39 Although gins offer a price linked to the world price (Cotlook A index), the substantial share of gins owned by 
Russian and Turkish groups operate as suppliers to textile mills in their home countries and they are more concerned 
about ensuing continuous supply of best quality cotton fiber than responding to short-run price signals. The main 
distortion in cotton markets may be a gap between the at-gin price for raw cotton (which is the basis for the domestic 
price in Table 7) and the farm-gate price, because many farmers sell to itinerant middle-men who take advantage of 
farmers’ ignorance of price information to pay low farm-gate prices.  
40 The Soviet transport network ignored republic boundaries. The train from Osh to Bishkek passed through 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan again and Kazakhstan before re-entering Kyrgyz territory. The railway no longer 
operates from Osh, and there is no internal rail network beyond the spur linking Bishkek to the Kazakhstan network. 
The road between the two major cities was only upgraded after the turn of the century; before that, the Bishkek-
Jalalabad road was of poor quality crossing through mountain passes which were often impassable in winter, while 
the Jalalabad–Osh sector passed through Uzbekistan and trucks were subject to delays and charges at the border as 
well as occasional unannounced border closures.  
41 The slow emergence of competitive trade in agricultural products is still striking to outside observers doing 
fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan. Shady “middle-men” still seem to play a disproportionate role in agricultural marketing, 
taking advantage of the asymmetry of price information and producers’ limited marketing alternatives to pay 
farmers low (farm-gate) prices. Significant costs are incurred in getting farm products to markets, including 
transport and bribes. Reports of informal checks by local police, who require payment of 30-200 som, are common 
(see, for example, World Bank 2005, pp. 72-3) drivers may take side roads to avoid the checks, but at the cost of 
longer driving time and increased fuel costs. The high domestic costs observed in local and regional markets reflect 
this combination of high rent-seeking and high transaction costs, and both producers and consumers bear these costs. 
The domestic market prices used in the Table 8 estimates may be substantially higher than farm-gate prices; a 
measure of producer support can be decomposed into two distortions (from the domestic market to the border, and 
also from the farm-gate to the domestic market), which have opposite signs in the Kyrgyz Republic.   22
so that there is a distinct risk that the extent of policy-induced distortions, as well as the 
immediate benefits of a more liberal trade regime, will be overestimated in the Kyrgyz setting. 
 
 
The political economy of policy choices in the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
 
The role of state farm managers and of local authorities in resisting farm reform was apparent in 
the Kyrgyz Republic, as in other Central Asian countries, in the early 1990s. Their long-term 
influence on the reform process was, however, uniquely limited, because serious land reform was 
undertaken after 1995 and (unlike in Kazakhstan) there was substantial structural change as the 
large farms were replaced by individual farms. The acquiescence of local authorities in farm 
reform may have partly reflected the sense of separateness of the South, where there were no 
good technical arguments against breaking up large farms and (unlike in Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan or Tajikistan) the central government did not impose on local authorities a policy 
of squeezing farm rents. More generally, President Akayev seems to have accepted arguments 
made by international financial institutions (and personal advisers such as Anders Aslund) 
against trying to retain close control over producers. Around the turn of the century this advice 
may have appeared flawed as lack of domestic revenue sources contributed to the Debt Crisis, 
but in the long-run the Kyrgyz Republic is much better placed for sustained agricultural growth 
than its neighbors which have squeezed farmers dry. 
The situation since the Tulip Revolution of March 2005 is confused. The new 
government was not fully constituted until the third quarter of 2005 and internal policy 
differences within the government, which is an uneasy coalition of the leading southern and 
northern politicians, remain. At the same time the government faced almost continuous crises as 
various interest groups, including criminal elements, scramble for the country’s assets and 
violence increased. A decline in agricultural output in 2005 was in part caused by the disruption. 
The political situation remains fluid and, although the major economic reforms appear to 
securely in place, the longer term implications for the economy are difficult to predict. The 2006 
Constitution gives significant power to Parliament, the first such constraint on presidential power 
in post-Soviet Central Asia. This may be a harbinger of a less personalized political system, with   23
policy continuity and incremental change. On the other hand, how the Constitution will be 
implemented remains unclear, as the President remains skeptical of limitations to executive 
power and as the cohesiveness of Parliament is tested by events such as the resignation of the 
government in December 2006. 
 
 
Future policy reform paths 
 
 
The Kyrgyz Republic inherited a situation where the main agricultural exports were bulky 
unprocessed commodities or the processed outputs of inefficient processing plants, and a major 
challenge has been to shift to higher-value specialized products and a processing sector based on 
local raw materials. The dilemma is highlighted by the huge sugar refinery, whose closure would 
have been economically disastrous for the local economy, but whose long-run value has long 
been known to be dubious. Sustainable agricultural development will involve continuous shifts 
away from such activities (including the extensive fodder- and fuel-intensive livestock farming 
of the Soviet era) to a more intensive farming based on good quality products such as dairy, fruit 
and vegetables, and cotton. 
The ability to make this quality transition is limited not only by ongoing domestic market 
distortions due to sub-standard institutions and infrastructure, but also by the high costs of transit 
imposed by neighboring countries. This is especially true for perishable fruits and vegetables and 
dairy products.
42 The trade facilitation and transit situation is improving with respect to 
Kazakhstan, which is an important local market for producers in the northern part of the Kyrgyz 
Republic as well as an important transit route to Russia or western China.
43 Almaty, the biggest 
urban market in Central Asia and only two hours’ drive from the Kyrgyz border (contiguous with 
the rich farming oblast of Chui), has the only large modern supermarkets in the region and is the 
                                                 
42 The elimination of onion exports to Russia in 1998-9 as a result of the high costs of transiting Kazakhstan is 
highlighted in Pomfret (2006, pp. 209-10). The World Bank (2005, pp. 70-84) describes the high costs imposed on 
dairy goods producers by traffic controls and by inspection agencies. 
43 Although the Kyrgyz Republic borders China, the mountains are high and the immediate border towns small; 
trade with western China’s largest urban center, Urumqi, is more convenient through Kazakhstan. Overland trade 
with potentially important partners like Turkey or Iran (and via the closest ocean port, Bandar Abbas) is discouraged 
by the poor transit regime in Uzbekistan, while transit through Tajikistan and Afghanistan to the booming markets 
of South Asia is more hazardous.   24
source of growing demand for Kyrgyz inputs into processed farm products.
44 Nevertheless, trade 
costs remain unnecessarily high, and any improvement in regional cooperation on trade and 







The Kyrgyz Republic is intriguing among the Soviet successor states for being one of the poorest 
and also one which embraced rapid and deep reforms. The transition strategy and economic 
policies focused on fairly rapid price liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and 
privatization. It was the first former Soviet republic to join the World Trade Organization. 
However, the effect of the reforms was disappointing, largely because the institutional 
environment for a well-functioning market economy still does not exist. In the early 1990s the 
country experienced a severe transitional recession and high incidence of poverty. Incipient 
recovery in 1996-7 was damaged by the Russian Crisis of 1998 and a domestic banking crisis, 
and again by a debt crisis in 2001. 
Nevertheless, farm output recovered substantially after the mid-1990s and overall 
agricultural performance in the decade after 1991 was the best in the CIS. In the farm sector, 
prices were quickly freed and subsidies largely eliminated by the mid-1990s. Since the mid-
1990s the Kyrgyz Republic has had a liberal trade policy, with a maximum tariff rate of 15 
percent, no specific duties and no quantitative restrictions on trade. Land privatization, initiated 
in 1991, was slow until 1994, but between 1995 and 2000 almost the entire sector was reformed 
with the 500 collective and state farms being replaced by over 60,000 individual farms. Since 
2001 land has been private property in a meaningful sense and a functioning land market exists. 
The comprehensive reforms of the farm sector contributed to the rapid reduction of the country’s 
high rural poverty rates after the mid-1990s. 
                                                 
44 The development of supermarkets in the Kyrgyz Republic has been much slower, and limited to the capital city. 
Most of the ’supermarkets’ are the size of a convenience store in western Europe or North America, although the 
situation in Bishkek is changing rapidly as stores become more modern and consumer-oriented and in 2006 
Ramstore, one of the largest shops in Almaty, opened a supermarket in Bishkek.   25
Estimates of distortions to agricultural producers’ incentives for six major products 
(wheat, maize, cotton, milk, poultry meat and wool) from 1995 to 2004 indicate that many 
domestic prices are substantially above reference prices based on the border price. This is 
especially true for wheat and maize, which had large positive price gaps throughout the period. 
The pattern for cotton is more erratic, although farmers appear to have benefited from the 
establishment of a competitive ginning sector in the second half of the 1990s. For the livestock 
products covered in this analysis, the price gap was negative for milk and wool producers during 
the second half of the 1990s, but has generally been positive since 1999. In the years 2000-4 
wool and poultry meat producers enjoyed the largest price gap of any of the commodities 
studied. 
The estimates of producer support, with the possible exception of cotton since 2000, 
reflect the slow process of creating integrated well-functioning markets in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
For most products, high trade costs reduce the usefulness of the world price (or any other border 
price) as an appropriate reference price from which to measure distortions. Farmers may be price 
responsive, but they respond to local prices in a poorly integrated national market which is 
largely disconnected from external markets. 
Despite the slow process of constructing a market economy, public policy has been good 
in terms of creating ownership rights and competitive market structures. For Kyrgyzstan, the 
impact of changing incentives is captured powerfully and graphically by changes in the level and 
composition of agricultural production and trade. Not only has sectoral output fully recovered, it 
has also undergone a dramatic transformation, from dominance by livestock production and the 
export of processed commodities, to crop production and the export of raw commodities. This 
has occurred in a stable, highly liberalised trade environment with minimal government support, 
and rural poverty has fallen as a consequence. Assuming that the costs of trade will continue to 
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Table 1: Land resources and population by oblast, Kyrgyz Republic, 1995 and 2001 
 
(a) 1 January 1995 
 






















Jalalabad 2,792 159 7 821 0.19  0.12
Osh 4,208  259 129 1,409 0.18  0.09
Issyk-Kul 4,391 188 137 419 0.45  0.33
Naryn 4,412  133 111 262 0.51  0.42
Talas 1,444  120 89 202 0.59  0.44












  Share of total 
oblast land that is 
arable 
(percent) 
Share of total 
arable land in the 
country 
(percent) 
Share of total 
rural population 
(percent) 
Cultivable land per 
person (hectares) 
Batken
a  4 6  10  0.23 
Jalalabad 5  13  21  0.23 
Osh 7 15  29  0.20 
Issyk-Kul 4  15  9  0.63 
Naryn 3  10  7 0.60 
Talas 9  9  5 0.64 












a Osh oblast was divided into Batken and Osh oblasts in 1999. 
 
Source: World Bank (2003, p. 39) 
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1992  39.0 37.8  33.7 23.2     
1993  41.0 32.0  26.3 27.0     
1994  40.9 25.5  21.8 33.7 10.84 340  316
1995  43.9 19.5  9.3 36.6 10.82 409  522
1996  49.7 18.3  8.5 32.0 12.81 505  838
1997  44.6 22.8  14.8 32.6 17.36 604  709
1998  39.5 22.8  15.5 37.7 20.84 514  842
1999  37.7 25.0  14.0 37.3 39.01 454  600
2000  36.8 31.0  19.5 32.2 47.70 505  554
2001  37.3 28.9  19.0 33.8 48.38 476  467
2002  37.7 23.3  14.3 39.0 46.94 486  587
2003  37.1 22.3  14.6 40.6 43.65 582  717
2004  36.6 21.1  13.6 42.3 42.65 719  941
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, accessed at www/worldbank.org
Year  Population  Income Agriculture 


















  million  US$ thousand thousand 
hectares  hectares 
1992  4.5 2.9  510 574 1,350 0.30 2.35  2.29
1993  4.5 2.9  450 568 1,370 0.30 2.41  2.23
1994  4.5 2.9  370 563 1,367 0.30 2.43  2.30
1995  4.6 3.0  350 559 1,273 0.28 2.28  2.27
1996  4.7 3.0  380 557 1,372 0.29 2.46  2.28
1997  4.7 3.0  390 556 1,371 0.29 2.47  2.26
1998  4.8 3.1  350 556 1,360 0.28 2.45  2.23
1999  4.9 3.2  300 556 1,368 0.28 2.46  2.20
2000  4.9 3.2  280 555 1,335 0.27 2.41  2.17
2001  5.0 3.3  280 557 1,325 0.27 2.38  2.17
2002  5.0 3.3  290 558 1,308 0.26 2.34  2.15
2003  5.0 3.3  340 559 1,310 0.26 2.34  2.13
2004  5.1 3.4  400           31




  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Growth in Real GDP  -5  -19  -16  -20  -5  7  10  2  4 
Inflation (CPI)  85  855 772 229 41 31 26 36  12 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Growth in Real GDP  5  5  0  7  7  -1  4 
Inflation  (CPI)  19  7 2 3 4 4 6 
 
a 2005 = preliminary actual figures from official government sources, 2006 = EBRD projections. 
 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report 2006, pp. 32-4.   32
Table 4: Gross value of agricultural output, Kyrgyz Republic, 1990 and 2004 
 
  1990 2004 
 Value  in 
million 1983  
(rubles) 





Share of Total 
Agricultural Output
(percent)
Grain 159  5.9  10,442 19.0 
Potatoes 62  2.3  3,810 6.9 
Vegetables 110  4.1  4,701 8.6 
Cotton 47  1.7  1,870 3.4 
Tobacco 220 8.1  245 0.4 
Fruit 66  2.4 
Sugar beet     636 1.2 
     925 1.7 
Other Crops  257  9.4 
Total Crops  922  33.9 
Beef and veal  353  13.0 
Mutton and lamb  298  10.9 
Pork 95  3.5 
Poultry 104  3.8 




Milk 449  16.5  7,832 !4.3 
Eggs 62  2.3  777 1.4 







Other products     7,694 14 
Total agriculture  2723  100  54,955 100 
 
Source: World Bank (1992, Table 6.4); National Statistical Committee (Natskomstat).   33




water use fees 




- water use & 
irrigation charged  received 
1993 117.8  24.5 236.1 n.a. 
1994 86.3  46.6 115.1 1.0 
1995 158.5  79.4 96.2 17.4 
1996 181.1  91.6 95.4 30.8 
1997 238.3  113.6 85.6 55.9 
1998 350.4  142.9 178.9 49.0 
1999 388.8  195.5 148.8 70.8 
2000 476.1  202.9 142.5 76.1 
2001 606.9  253.5 165.8 81.1 
2002 744.1  293.1 155.5 63.9 
2003 783.0  307.6 n.a. 60.4 
2004 896.0  408.6 n.a. 63.7 
 
Sources: Budget Execution reports; Ministry of Finance and Economy; Ministry of Agriculture 
and Water Resources; National Statistical Committee (Natskomstat).   34
 Table 6: Nominal rate of assistance estimates for wheat, Kyrgyz Republic, 2000 to 2004 
 
(as a percentage of farm-gate revenue) 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1 Production  (thousand  tons)  1,039 1,191 1,163 1,014 998 
2 Border  price
 a (fob, US dollars)  79 90 73 81 128 
3  Exchange rate (som/USD)  47.7 48.5 46.9 43.7 42.7 
4  Domestic currency price (som/ton) = 2x3
  3,768 4,365 3,423 3,540 5,466 
5  Transport, handling, etc. (som/ton)  2,263 2,305 2,110 2,167 2,484 
6  Reference price (som/ton) = 4-5  1,505 2,060 1,313 1,373 2,982 
7  Producer price (som/ton)  5,354 5,868 4,730 3,977 5,796 
8  Price gap = 7-6  3,849 3,808 3,417 2,604 2,814 
Nominal rate of assistance (%) = 100*(8/7)  72  65  72  65 49 
 
 
a border price is the unit value of wheat imports from Kazakhstan. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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Table 7: Nominal rate of assistance estimates for cotton, Kyrgyz Republic, 2000 to 2004 
 
(as a percentage of farm-gate revenue) 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1  Production (thousand tons fiber)  28,708 33,662 43,000 42,500  48,000
2 Border  price
a (fob, US dollars)  1,191 852 1,160 1,456  1,100
3  Exchange rate (som/USD)  47.7 48.5 46.9 43.7  42.7
4  Domestic currency price (som/ton)
  56,811 41,322 54,404 63,627 46,970
5 Transport
b, handling, etc. (som/ton)  11,744 9,798 11,361 12,266  10,004
6  Price of fiber ex-gin (som/ton)   45,067 31,524 43,043 51,361  36,966
7  Ginning costs (som/ton)  7,155 7,275 7,035 6,555  6,405
8 Seed  value  (som/ton)  8,491 8,633 8,348 7,779 7,601
9 Reference  price
 c, fiber (som/ton)  46,402 32,882 44,356 52,585  38,162
10 Reference  price
 c, raw cotton (som/ton)  13648 8730 12963 16130  11002
11  Producer price (som/ton)  10,690 13,495 12,231 15,748  18,926
12 Price  gap  -2,958 4,765 -732 -382  7,924
Nominal rate of assistance (%) = 100*(12/11) -28  35  -6  -2  42
 
a Border price is the Cotlook A index minus $70 (for conversion of cif to fob);  
b Transport and handling etc consist of $10 handling at the gin, $10 insurance and $85 for 
transport from gin to the border plus marketing costs (15 percent of line 6). 
c The reference price of fiber ex-gin (line 6) = ((raw cotton price + ginning cost)/ginning ratio) - 
((value of cotton seed left over)*(0.64/0.36)). With a ginning ratio of 36 percent, 1 ton of 
cotton fiber requires 2.78 (= 1/0.36) tons raw cotton, and 64 percent of the 2.78 tons will be 
seed. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates.   36
Table 8: Nominal rates of assistance for major agricultural products
a, Kyrgyz Republic, 1993 to 
2004 
(as a percentage of farm-gate revenue) 
 
 
Commodity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Wheat 64 46 33 75 68 72 65 72 65 49 
Cotton 1 5  -39 9 -70 -28 35 -6 -2  42 
Maize -8 52 65 37 51 59 48 16 42 67 
Cow Milk  --  -315 -294  -44 37 22 24 -19 11  -- 
Poultry  meat -- -- -- -- -- 72 81 70 75  82 
Wool 1 0  -24  -4 -72 38 67 74 90  94 
 
a Cotton, cow milk and wool are export products (although milk may have been non-traded for 
most of the 1990s, hence the extreme values for 1996-8). Wheat, maize and poultry meat are 
import-competing. Empty cells (--) indicate insufficient data to calculate support estimates. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance for major agricultural products
a, Kyrgyz Republic, 1993 to 
2004 


































































           Source: Authors’ estimates.   39
Appendix Table A1: Production of main agricultural products, Kyrgyz Republic, 1993 to 2004 
 
(a) Crops (thousand tons) 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Wheat  831 566 625 964 1274 1204 1109 1039 1191 1163  1014 998
Barley  477 288 159 166 152 162 180 150 140 149 198 233
Maize  184 129 116 182 171 228 308 338 443 374 399 453
Raw  cotton   49 54 75 73 62 78 87 88 98 106  106  122
Sugarbeet  220 114 107 190 206 429 536 450 287 522 812 642
Tobacco  49 36 18 18 26 28 30 35 24 6  9 13
Potatoes  308 311 432 562 678 774 957 1046 1168 1244  1308  1363
Sunflower  2 3 8  14 19 25 39 40 47 62  59  67
Cabbage  24 24 30 40 60 72 89 101 119 69  104  113
Onions  82  91 106 106 119 115 176 147 149 84 104 117
Cucumber  9 11 15 20 29 36 46 50 58 26 50 56
Tomatoes  61 55 63 80 99 120 138 156 166 102  144  168
Carrots  24 24 32 41 60 82 105 109 113 65  126  127
Seed  fruits  35 68 57 73 90 86 83 127 125 103 94  114
Grapes  9 18 20 14 23 17 18 27 27 15 12 15
 
(b) Livestock products (thousand tons, eggs in millions) 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 
Raw  Cow  Milk  946  872  864  885  912  973  1064  1105 1142 1173 1192 1185 
Beef  Meat  88 82 85 86 95 95  95 101  100  105  94  95 
Sheep  Meat  82  76  54  54  44  44  47  43 44 44 44 45 
Pork  Meat  25  18  28  29  26  30  29  24 26 23 22 25 
Poultry  Meat  9  7  3  3  3  4  5  5 5 6 7 5 
Eggs  389  202  147  160  164  176  193  207 228 243 268 299 




a wheat flour in thousand tons, mineral water and vodka in thousand liters, cigarettes in millions, 
all other products in tons. 
Source: National Statistical Committee (Natskomstat). 
 1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Wheat  Flour  414 314 268 252 292  340 488 467 453 439 421  436 
Pasta  13732 6473 7585 8545  11980  10949 7964  40282 2090 1726 1837  1755 
Vegetable  Oil  4449 3314 2571 2974 4828  6851 7518 8748 6921 9386  10700  12322 
Sugar  15954 81623 69685  166790 89834  88280 70324 58011 30536 51192 75476  88130 
Cotton  Fibre  15731 16896 17657 21274 24990  22743 24526 28708 35662 48470 43232  48185 
Processed  Milk  65419 28441 14584  9375 10334  12880 11023 11450 16780 20912 25138  27414 
Butter  6794 3865 2034 1065 1470  1332 1236 1375 1852 1462 1808  1984 
Cheese  2161 1458  835  727  962  1307 1412 1711 1698 2208 2424  2574 
Frozen  Beef  18316  8382 5077 2608 2008  1657 2214 1344  904 1998 3483  3429 
Frozen Sheep 
Meat  8430  5274  1718 338 371  145  72 219 196 295 101  170 
Frozen  Pork  11002  3206  2110  1123  331  17 53 44 43 59 23  19 
Frozen Poultry  4057  900  63  27  141  220  308  106  50  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Mineral Water   3372  2814  5512  3747  6423  9805  8562  8211  9869  11138  10792  11781 
Vodka  8450  1236  985  1172  1636  1913  994 13613 18156 24103 24298  21848 
Cigarettes  3428 1943 1332  975  716  862 2103 3169 3013 2927 3102  3170   40




  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Wheat  338 333 364 452 550 511 483 506 505 486 437 412
Barley  236 207 151 108 83 81 102 88 74 67  89 103
Maize  41 37 35 46 38 47 61 66 76 65 67 74
Raw  cotton   20 27 33 32 25 32 35 34 38 40 41 46
Sugarbeet  12 10 14 14 12 22 29 34 23 27 32 27
Tobacco  22  19 9 9 12 13 13 15 10 3 4 6
Potatoes  27 34 44 49 56 59 64 69 74 52 83 85
Sunflower  4  7 16 21 20 29 40 39 44 52 49 56
C a b b a g e   2  2  3  3456663  5  5
O n i o n s   5  7   1 0  877 1 1885  5  6
C u c u m b e r   1  2  2  2334442  3  4
Tomatoes  3 5 6 7 7 8 9 10 10 6 8 9
C a r r o t s   2  2  4  4556763  6  6
Seed  fruits  31 33 31 34 34 33 34 34 33 28 28 28




  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Wheat  186 186 259 327 408 368 336 341 335 n.a. 294 261
Barley  106 83 81 59 46 41 50 47 41 n.a. 53 56
Maize  29 21 35 43 37 46 59 63 73 n.a. 65 72
Raw  cotton   19 25 33 32 25 32 35 34 38 n.a. 41 46
Sugar  beet  11  9 13 14 12 22 29 33 22 n.a. 32 27
Tobacco  21  18 9 9 12 13 13 15 10 n.a. 4 6
Potatoes  9  7 43 49 55 58 63 67 71 n.a. 82 83
Sunflower  3  4 12 14 13 19 25 21 22 n.a. 27 26
C a b b a g e   n . a .   n . a .  3  344666 n . a .  5  5
Onions  n.a.  n.a.  10 8 7 7 11 8 8 n.a. 5 6
C u c u m b e r   n . a .   n . a .  2  233444 n . a .  3  4
Tomatoes n.a.  n.a. 6 7 7 8 9 9 10 n.a. 8 9
C a r r o t s   n . a .   n . a .  4  455676 n . a .  6  6
Seed  fruits  14 17 26 34 34 33 34 33 32 n.a.  n.a. 28
G r a p e s   7  7  7  788888 n . a .   n . a .  7
 
Source: National Statistical Committee (Natskomstat). 
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Appendix Table A3: Principal exports, Kyrgyz Republic, 2002 
 
HS code  Description  Value (US$m) Share (percent) 
710812   Non-monetary gold  162.8 35.4 
520100  Cotton, not carded or combed  43.7 9.5 
271000 Petroleum  oils  35.3 7.7 
271600 Electrical  energy  22.0 4.8 
240110  Tobacco, not stemmed/stripped  19.6 4.3 
410121  Whole hides and skins of bovine animals 15.5 3.4 
853922  Other filament lamps  11.2 2.4 
870290  Other motor vehicles (>10 passengers)  7.2 1.6 
071333 Beans  6.5 1.4 
681110 Corrugated  sheets  5.6 1.2 
170199  Other cane or beet sugar   5.3 1.1 
   334.7 72.8 
 
Source: Official data reported to UN COMTRADE.   42
Appendix Table A4: Agricultural exports & imports by value, Kyrgyz Republic, 1994 and 2004 
(in thousand US dollars) 
1994 2004  Product 
Description Imports Exports Imports Exports
Wheat 54,440 48 11,019 239
Maize 14 0 264 0
Other cereals (barley)  3 6 1 3
Sugarbeet 0 1,108






Carrots and turnips  0 397
Fruits and berries  2 68
Apples   1,875 549
Grapes 0 2 10 65
Sunflower 0 837
Eggs 80 232 119 0




Beef skins  26 3,140 27 1,201
Tobacco, not stemmed  0 97 352 10,655
Tobacco, stemmed  25 19,944 2,567 927
Flour 148 430 2,586 81
Pasta 47 16
Sugar 3,884 10,733 17,940 21,977
Cotton fiber  1,519 19,149 0 38,523
Dried fruits  211 34
Dried apples  0 0
Dried apricots  0 21
Vegetable oil  3,140 191
Sunflower oil  3,749 1
Cotton oil  2,991 11
Processed milk & products  816 2,800
Processed milk <1 percent  0 130
Processed milk 1-6 percent  18 2,667
Butter 211 969
Cottage cheese  121 1,547
Soft cheese  269 370
Hard cheese  14 876
Meat 174 2,570
Fresh beef  0 183
Frozen beef  67 18
Fresh mutton  0 1
Frozen mutton  0 15  43
Appendix Table A4 (continued): Agricultural exports and imports by value, Kyrgyz Republic, 
1994 and 2004 
(in thousand US dollars) 
 
1994 2004  Product 
Description Imports Exports Imports  Exports
Fresh pork    2 0
Frozen pork    0 7
Fresh poultry    2 0
Frozen poultry    37 0
Frozen chicken pieces    4,372 0
Non-alcoholic drinks  240  46
Mineral water    274 14
Vodka 203  3,021 766 4
Cigarettes 540  711 11,777 107
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Appendix Table A5: Value of agricultural exports and imports, Kyrgyz Republic, 2005  
 
(a) Exports over $1 million (in thousand US dollars and percent)
 a 
 
HS code  Description  Exports Share (percent) 
010119 Live  horses  1,191 0.9 
010290 Live  bovine  animals  1,344 1.0 
040120   Milk & cream 1-6 percent fat  5,216 3.9 
040390 Buttermilk  1,856 1.4 
040610  Fresh uncured cheese  2,589 2.0 
070820 Beans  2,001 1.5 
071333  Dried kidney beans  8,933 6.7 
080232 Walnuts  1,572 1.2 
151719  Edible preparations of veg oils & fats 2,383 1.8 
1701  Cane or beet sugar   11,202 8.4 
210500 Ice  cream  2,239 1.7 
220210 Mineral  water  5,325 4.0 
240110 Tobacco,  raw  10,475 7.9 
4101  Hides and skins of bovine leather  6,455 4.9 
4102  Hides and skins of sheep or lambs  2,061 1.6 
410422 Bovine  leather  1,768 1.3 
520100  Cotton, not carded or combed  40,134 30.3 
520300  Cotton, carded or combed  1,230 0.9 
520532  Uncombed cabled cotton yarn  1,459 1.1 
 
a Export shares are of the agricultural total ($133 million) in the panel above. 
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Appendix Table A5 (continued): Value of agricultural exports and imports, Kyrgyz Republic, 
2005  
 
(b) Imports over $1 million (in thousand US dollars and percent)
 b  
 
 




Description Imports  Share 
(percent) 
020741  Frozen cuts and offal of chicken  5,964  3.5
030350 Frozen  herrings  1,006  0.6
080810 Apples  5,005  2.9
0902 Tea  2,939  1.7
1001 Wheat  17,574  10.3
1006 Rice  1,242  0.7
110100 Wheat  flour  9,003  5.3
1511  Palm oil   1,040  0.6
151219  Sunflower-seed and safflower oil  6,152  3.6
151229 Cotton-seed  oil  1,237  0.7
151710 Margarine  1,727  1.0
151719  Edible preparations of veg oils & fats  2,383  1.4
1701  Cane or beet sugar  23,329  13.7
170490 Sugar  confectionery  3,911  2.3
1806 Chocolate  11,123  6.5
1901 Malt  extracts  1,292  0.8
1902 Pasta  1,598  0.9
1905  Bread, pastry, cakes, etc.  5,757  3.4
220210 Mineral  water  4,052  2.4
220300 Beer  12,092  7.1
220421 Wine  1,152  0.7
2208 Spirituous  beverages  2,154  1.3
240220 Cigarettes  18,075  10.6
4101  Hides and skins of bovine leather  2,588  1.5  46
Appendix Table A5 (continued): Value of agricultural exports and imports, Kyrgyz Republic, 
2005  
 
(c) HS 2-digit exports and imports (thousand US dollars) 
 
  Description Exports Imports 
01 Live  animals  2,888 3 
02  Meat and edible meat offal  56 6,789 
03  Fish & crustacean, mollusc & other   0 1,312 
04  Dairy prod; birds' eggs; natural honey  14,369 3,768 
05  Products of animal origin, nes   819 34 
06  Live tree & other plant; bulb, roots  65 193 
07  Edible vegetables and certain roots  13,624 332 
08  Edible fruit and nuts  4,015 6,960 
09  Coffee, tea, and spices.  1,091 3,147 
10 Cereals  11 19,123 
11  Flour, meal, malt & starches   175 10,215 
12  Oil seeds, roots & other vegetable matter  765 593 
13  Gums, resins & other vegetable products  165 60 
14  Vegetable plaiting materials, & vegetable matter nes 20 13 
15  Animal/vegetable fats & oils & clarifying agents  1,893 13,311 
16  Preparations of meat, fish or crustaceans   344 890 
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery.  11,293 27,880 
18  Cocoa and cocoa preparations.  873 11,405 
19  Preparations of cereal, flour, starch/milk;  1,447 8,852 
20  Preparations of vegetable, fruit, nuts or olives  2,076 4,462 
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations.  2,590 4,260 
22  Beverages, spirits and vinegar.  6,123 20,647 
23  Residues & waste from the food industry  26 1,464 
24  Tobacco and manufactured tobacco  12,438 21,186 
41  Raw hides and skins (other than furs)  11,985 2,661 
52 Cotton.  43,232 200 
53  Other vegetable textile fibres  194 432 
  Total of above categories  132,577 170,192 
 Total  trade  672,014 1,107,818 
 
Source: Source: Trade data from UN-COMTRADE database   47
Appendix Table A6: Farm-gate prices for main agricultural products, Kyrgyz Republic, 1993 to 
2004  
(som/ton) 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Wheat 293  588 1394 2551 2218  2290 
Maize n.a.  n.a. 1091 1358 2048  1838 
Barley n.a.  n.a. 700 1510 1770  2489 
Raw 
cotton 2169  9430 5286 5848 4979  6818 
Sugar beet  121  375 570 701 603  605 
Tobacco 4137  3679 4349 9189 9593  9855 
Potatoes 637  1082 1579 2080 2082  2442 
Sunflower n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
Vegetables 557 944 1156 2517 2955  3541 
Onions 689  797 1081 1650 1621  3265 
Cucumber 1096  1516 1267 2108 14288  14593 
Tomatoes 648  1317 423 2175 10626  12118 
Carrots 505  612 970 1992 2265  2867 
Fruits and 
berries 876  534 1388 1999 3706  8532 
Seed fruits  906  489 265 1965 6274  8293 
Cabbage 588  793 1104 1863 2338  3542 
Grapes 445  2483 2334 3828 5015  6670 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Wheat 3799  5354 5868 4730 3977  5796 
Maize 2221  3256 4538 4196 3315  3900 
Barley 2878  3822 5381 3940 3965  5336 
Raw 
cotton 5850  10690 13495 12231 15748  18926 
Sugarbeet 784  1000 1000 1200 1294  1000 
Tobacco 10385  18867 18320 13268 14590  18264 
Potatoes 3903  3701 3497 5000 5916  3134 
Sunflower n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
Vegetables 2680 3710 6264 4005 5866 4445 
Onions 3138  3239 6535 3347 5312  5119 
Cucumber 11688  3940 6414 6514 7116  7059 
Tomatoes 9563  3043 4089 5399 6362  5309 
Carrots 2931  3267 4784 3939 5771  4309 
Fruits and 
berries 10447  11875 10470 17165 16708  17741 
Seed fruits  9978  11817 10373 17381 16633  16801 
Cabbage 2680  3710 6264 4005 5866  7778 
Grapes 6875  6472 5690 5970 6183  6714 
Source: National Statistical Committee (agricultural statistics department) Kyrgyzstan in 
Numbers.   48
Appendix Table A7: Tariff rates on selected products, Kyrgyz Republic, 1998 to 2004  
(percent) 
 












100190910    Soft  wheat  0  5 0 0 0 0 
100590000    Maize  0-5  10 10 10  5  5 
100300900    Barley  0  10 10 10  5  5 
121291800    Sugarbeet  0  5 0 0 0 0 
070190900    Potatoes  15  20 0  17.5 0  15 
070490100    Cabbage  20  15 10 10 10 10 
071110  Onion  20  15 10 10 15  0-10 
071140  Cucumber  15  15 10 10 15 15 
0702    Tomatoes  15  15 10 10 15 15 
0706  Carrots  15  10 10 10  10-15  10-15 
0808  Apples 0.2  ecu/kg.  10 10 10 10 10 
200899430  Grapes  20  20 20  17.5 15 15 
0806  Sunflower  0  5 0 0 0 0 
0401  Fresh  cow  milk 15  15 10 10 10 10 
040700300  Eggs  0-5  15 10 10 10 10 
5105  Wool  15  10 10 10  5  5 
410210  Beef  skins  n.d.  5 0 0 0 0 
2401 Tobacco 
fermented  0  5 0 0 0 0 
2401 Tobacco  non 
fermented  5  5 0 0 0 0 
3102  30    Silitra  (fertilizer)  5  0 0 0 0 0 
Agricultural Processing  
110100150  Wheat  flour  10  10 0 0  10  10 
1902  Pasta  5  10 10 10 10 10 
1701 12  Sugar (from 
sugar beet)  1  1 0 0 0 0 
2401  Tobacco  5  5 0 0 0 0 
520100    Cotton  fiber  n.d.  0 0 0 0 0 
081330    Dried  apples  10  10 10 10 10 10 
081310    Dried  apricots  10  10 10 10 10 10 
151211910    Sunflower  oil  5  5  0 10 10 10 
151221900    Cotton  oil  5  5  0 10 10 10 
0401 Processed  milk 
1-3  percent  15  15 10 10 10 10 
0401 Processed  milk 
3-6  percent  15  15 10 10 10 10 
040510    Butter  10  10 10 10 10 10 
040610200  Cottage  cheese  10  10 10 10 10 10 
0406  Soft  cheese  10  10 10 10 10 10 
0406  Hard  cheese  10  10 10 10 10 10 
020210  Frozen beef  15 (0.15 
ecu/kg)  10  0 10 10 10 
020441    Frozen  mutton n.d.  10 10 10 10 10 
020430    Frozen  lamb  n.d.  10 10 10 10 10 
0203 21   Frozen pork  15 (0.15 
ecu/kg)  10  0 10 10 10 
020712    Frozen  chicken  n.d.  15 10 10 10 10 
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020714   Frozen chicken 
pieces  n.d.  10 10 10 10 10 
220110    Mineral  water  20  15 10 10 10 10 
220860    Vodka  60  10 10 10 10    10 
2402 Cigarettes  – 
filtered 
15 (3 
ecu/1000)  10 10 10  10-15  10-15 
2402 Cigarettes  - 
unfiltered 
10 (3 
ecu/1000)  10 10 10  10-15  10-15 
Selected Non-agricultural goods 
271600 Electricity 
5 for 1000 
kWt  5 10 10 10 10 
270900100    Gas  5  0 0 0 5 5 
270900  
Petroleum 
products  5  0-10 0 0 5 5 
7108  Gold  5  10 10 10 10 10 
2612  Uranium  5  for  1kg  5 0 0 5 5 
280540    Mercury  5  5  10 0 5 5 
2701  Coal  5  5 0 0 5 5 
7201  Ferrous  metals  5  5-10  0-10 0 0 0 
6101-6304  Textiles  20  10-17.5 10-17.5 10-17.5  10-15  10-12 
8401-8527  Machinery  10  0-20 0-20 0-10 0-10 0-10 
 
Source: Annual Law on Customs Tariff 
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Appendix Table A8: Trade-weighted applied tariffs, Kyrgyz Republic, 2002 and 2003 
 
  2002 2003
Paddy rice  9.9 9.9
Wheat 3.3 0
Other cereal grains  6.9 4.8
Vegetables, fruit & nuts  5.2 3.8
Oil seeds  0.7 0
Plant-based fibers  5.0 0
Other crops  7.4 4.5
Cattle, sheep, goats & horses  4.3 0
Other animal products  5.3 2.6
Wool & silkworm cocoons  10.0 2.7
Primary agriculture  4.8 2.8
Meat 9.4 8.1
Meat products  10.6 10.0
Vegetable oils & fats  6.8 9.2
Dairy products  9.7 9.6
Processed rice  10.0 10.0
Sugar 12.7 20.0
Other Food products  9.4 8.0
Beverages & tobacco products  10.5 10.0
Processed food  10.2 10.8
 
Source: UNCTAD-TRAINS database, accessed June 2006. 